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SES Dutch House of Representatives

The European Commission has been developing the Single European Sky project in the aviation sector since 2004 in order to “enhance current safety standards and overall efficiency for general air traffic in Europe, to optimise capacity meeting the requirements of all airspace users and to minimise delays”.¹

Two legislative packages have been published on Single European Sky: the first Single European Sky I – SES I², in 2004, and the second SES II³, in 2009.

In 2009, with the adoption of the SES II package, the European Commission intended to complete the creation of Single European Sky by adopting measures in key areas such as the environment, capacity, cost efficiency and introducing a performance framework for the European ATM (air traffic management) system using quantifiable targets, while always bearing in mind essential safety objectives. The figure of network manager was also created in order to coordinate action at European network level.

The commitment to these objectives was strengthened by setting ambitious targets to be reached by 2020.⁴ A large modernisation project for the technology underlying the European air traffic management system was launched in 2007 (the SESAR Project⁵).

With the SES2+ package, the European Commission generally aims to “improve the competitiveness of the European Aviation system vis-á-vis other comparable regions, and in particular develop further the Single European Sky initiative”.⁶

This need arose because the European Commission considered that “the implementation of the SES and associated reform of the European ATM system must be accelerated, helping our airspace users in a tough global competitive environment, and facilitating future economic growth.”⁷

The Assembly of the Republic of Portugal has monitored the development of Single European Sky and has even passed an opinion on the matter. Although the European Commission believes that implementation has fallen below initial expectations, particularly regarding compliance with performance targets and the effective implementation of functional airspace blocks (FABs), it is our understanding that the clear improvements that have been achieved in recent years cannot be downplayed.

In the performance analysis for the first reference period of the SES performance scheme (RP1 – 2012-2014)⁸, the European Commission gives its evaluation of the evolution of performance indicator figures: “As regards safety, there have been no fatal accidents in which ATM was a contributing factor since 2011. With regard to the environment, horizontal enroute flight efficiency (shorter routes) improved slightly in 2013 (5.11%) but did not meet the target (4.92%). In 2014, flight efficiency stood at 4.9%, falling short of the target of 4.67% for the first reference period. With respect to capacity good progress has been made in reducing capacity delay. As regards cost-efficiency, during RP1 air navigation service providers (ANSPs) were able to reduce their cost bases because of lower-than-planned traffic volumes. Actual costs were each year between -3.4% and -5.9% lower than planned costs (or determined costs).”

It can therefore be seen that although some of the goals have not been fully achieved, there were clear improvements in the period in question. For that reason, we believe that the efforts made by all the stakeholders in the sector – namely representatives of Member States, national supervisory authorities and air navigation service providers – must be acknowledged.

As introductory notes, we cannot avoid discussing two topics that are particularly emphasised in Commission documents and consistently compared to US indicators: the impact of air navigation costs and the existing model in Europe for airspace control.

1 – The European Commission expresses concerns about the heavy impact of air navigation costs on airlines’ operational costs, stating that in 2010 total air navigation service charges represented 6.2% of total operational costs. ⁹ This assessment includes all costs to airlines for air traffic management, not just in Europe but throughout the world. There is therefore a need to clarify what the costs incurred were only for European air traffic management.

It is important to highlight that these costs are, in effect, borne by passengers when buying their tickets. It is therefore warranted for consumers to be heard on issues related to European aviation, which has not been the case until now. We acknowledge that, when questioned about the issue of costs, they may show an interest in analysing the causes behind the remaining 93.8% of airline costs, and may not agree to restrict analysis to 6.2%.

2 – The European Commission favours a comparison between the different European indicators and the indicators of the United States (US) as a way of supporting their argument. We understand that comparisons with the US regarding efficiency will not always be the most fortunate.

Discussing an airspace that the Commission considers to be similar – although it recognises that it is roughly 10% smaller than the airspace of the 39 states in the Eurocontrol area – it begins by stating that the airspace is controlled by a single service provider, as opposed to 38 in the European airspace. ¹⁰ It is important to stress that the European Union is not a federation of states, so the Member States should clearly say that they find it perfectly natural for there to be one provider per country (as in the US). Portugal does not intend to forego the management of its own airspace using national air navigation service providers.

The European Commission then highlights the fact that a single service provider in the US controls almost 70% more flights than operate in the EU, with 38% fewer staff. Based on the same data used by the European Commission¹¹, there are 14,600 controllers at the American service provider, while there are 16,700¹² controllers among the 38 European providers; in other words, only 13% more for a territory that is 10% larger.

Meanwhile, the document¹³ distributed for discussion at the informal meeting of the Ministers for Transport of the European Union, which took place in Vilnius, contains the statement that “the US system covers the same size of airspace (…) with less 7% controllers”. This percentage would have been taken from a document¹⁴ dated 17 May 2013 that was prepared by the Performance Review Body (PRB). Using data for 2011, it contains the information that, in the operational structure in the US, formed of a total of 35,500 workers, there were 13,300 air traffic controllers.¹⁵ As mentioned previously, the European Commission working document SWD(2013) 206 final states that in 2010 the US had 35,200 workers, of which 14,600 were air traffic controllers. Therefore, and strictly in relation to the number of controllers, the difference – if there is one and in the event that there are more controllers in the EU than the US, in light of the fact that there are discrepancies in the data – is minimal and should not be an obstacle to properly meeting the goals that the SES2+ package intends to achieve.

Furthermore, the COM forgets to mention other data in that figure: there are 20 Area Control Centres (ACCs) in the US while there are 63 in the Eurocontrol area; in other words, while the US has an average of 730 air traffic controllers per ACC, that number falls to 265 in Europe.

These comparisons merely serve to demonstrate that there are two situations and two en-route air traffic control models under consideration: one which is more centralised, with 20 en-route control centres, and the other more decentralised, with 63. The models cannot be compared, despite having a similar number of controllers.

Regarding costs, there is no way to make comparisons, not only because the US does not have a social model remotely similar to the model that prevails in Europe (which significantly raises costs), but also because any possible subsidies to the system that may exist in the US are not identified or even mentioned.

1

Note: See final opinion of the Assembly of the Republic

Throughout the SES2+ package, there is a clear desire to reduce competences and the power of Member States in the decision-making process regarding airspace management in favour of the European Commission. In fact, faced with the question “what is the value added of action at the EU level”, the Commission does not hesitate to say that the solution involves “…shifting airspace management from national level to the EU level…” ¹⁶, which we consider to be unacceptable. The control of the airspace should remain the responsibility of each Member State.

The European Commission would also like to strengthen control and sanction mechanisms, with the members of the Performance Review Body being directly nominated by the European Commission to ensure impartiality.¹⁷ Currently, the Member States, on the Single Sky Committee, have the final word on targets, the adoption of performance plans and the acceptance of corrective measures in case targets are not reached. There is a clear desire to take power away from Member States in favour of the European Commission. We believe that the Single Sky Committee should remain involved in the procedure of appointing the Performance Review Body.

2

The European Commission highlights the fact that there are many air navigation service providers in Europe, each with its own system, training its own staff and following its own operating procedures.

In Portugal, there is a public company, NAV Portugal, which is responsible for air traffic control services. We believe that this situation – a monopoly – does not harm users of national airspace. Portugal has implemented the free route concept in its airspace and the route charges are far from those used by MUAC, for example, a control centre that serves several Member States.

NAV Portugal is highly committed to SWFAB with its Spanish counterpart. We recognise that the ambitious goals that were at the heart of its creation have not yet been reached. In any case, thanks to SWFAB, we have seen close collaboration in recent years between representatives of Member States, civil and military national authorities and air navigation service providers. This healthy initiative decisively contributes to improvements that have been felt in the Iberian space.

We must not forget that FABs were only implemented at the beginning of December 2012. In fact, given the complexity and ambition that underlie the entire Single European Sky project (specifically the SES II package), we must acknowledge the significant improvements that have already been achieved regarding performance, although naturally there is some way still to go.

We do not even consider the social problems because, as mentioned before, we believe that a different organisational model for air traffic control in Europe is not acceptable.

We believe that the network manager, within the scope of his/her work, should have contact not only with air traffic service providers but also with representatives of Member States and national supervisory authorities.

3

There is a very close relationship in Portugal between the air navigation service provider and the Air Force, and they work together closely within the context of SWFAB. It should also be noted that Portugal’s experience in this field has been worthy of analysis by our SWFAB partners with a view to improving procedures between civilian and military bodies in Spain.

4

As an initial issue, we would underline that we do not agree with the comparison with the US air traffic management and air navigation service provision model (designed to justify the “SES2+ legislative package”) made by the European Commission. The situations and airspace management models are completely different, starting with the fact that the European Union is not a federation, and all Member States have their own, full sovereignty over their airspace. Also, the two models involve very different social models, which naturally have an impact on staff costs.

This comparison is even more unreasonable when it is not mentioned that civil aviation regulatory powers are concentrated in the American FAA which, at the same time, is the air navigation service provider, something which would be impossible in the European Union, given that the current Regulations (EC) Nos 549/2004 and 551/2004 already impose separation between the bodies that regulate and supervise the sector and those that provide the service.

4.1 The COM intended to change the geographical scope of the proposal for a regulation COM(2013) 410 final (on the implementation of the Single European Sky) to similarly include the ICAO North Atlantic (NAT) region. We firmly oppose any interference by the European Commission in the NAT area, because it is an area delegated by the ICAO and it is not legitimate for the Commission to interfere at all, since European territory is not at stake.

4.2 We believe that the Member States’ commitment to developing FABs will surely lead to positive results, with the Member States maintaining control over the management of their airspace. It is up to Member States to assume responsibility for their airspace, making the decisions that they believe to be most appropriate to improve how they operate (specifically in terms of FABs).

We believe that Member States should not stop having full autonomy in appointing their air navigation service providers and managing their airspace.

4.3 The COM must accept that the improvements that are desired in the Single European Sky project should centre on FABs, particularly regarding the implementation of the free route system, identifying situations that make it possible to form closer connections between the nine FABs and the technological advances that are hoped to be achieved as part of the SESAR project.

5

The technological modernisation of SES is the determining factor for improvements that we hope to see in the control of the European airspace. We agree with the position expressed by the European Commission on this matter in the report submitted on 16 December 2015.¹⁸ The issues related to interoperability (one of the key objectives of SES is to harmonise and achieve interoperability between the systems, constituent parts and associated procedures of the European ATM network, and to ensure that new operational concepts or technology relating to ATM are introduced in a coordinated manner) and the need to see the projects that are being developed as part of SESAR implemented quickly are, in our view, essential to the development of SES.

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1. Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, Article 1(1).↩︎

2. Regulations (EC) Nos 549, 550, 551 and 552/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1070/2009 of 21 October 2009.↩︎

3. Regulation (EC) No 1070/2009 of 21 October 2009.↩︎

4. Tripling capacity, a ten-fold improvement in safety, a 10% reduction in the environmental impact of flights and a reduction of at least 50% in the cost of air traffic management services for airspace users.↩︎

5. Technological component of Single European Sky.↩︎

6. SWD(2013) 207 final, point 3, page 3↩︎

7. COM(2013) 408 final, point 1.1, page 3↩︎

8. REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation and progress of the Single European Sky during the 2012-2014 period, COM(2015) 663 final of 16.12.2015↩︎

9. SWD(2013) 206 final, page 12, “Cost of air traffic management”↩︎

10. SWD(2013) 207 final, point 1↩︎

11. SWD(2013) 206 final, Figure 2-5, page 14↩︎

12. In COM(2013) 408 final, point 1.2, page 4, it is stated, we believe by mistake, that “the number of European air traffic controllers has risen to around 14500”.↩︎

13. Discussion paper on Single European Sky, 19 July 2013↩︎

14. “Union wide targets for the 2nd reference period of the Single European Sky performance scheme”, Performance Review Body, 17 May 2013↩︎

15. “Union wide targets for the 2nd reference period of the Single European Sky performance scheme”, Performance Review Body, 17 May 2013, Figure 24, page 74↩︎

16. SWD(2013) 206 final, page 4↩︎

17. COM(2013) 408 final, point 3.1, page 6↩︎

18. COM(2015) 663 final↩︎