

ANNEX

Notification of a temporary reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders

1. Notification submitted by:

The Netherlands

2. Date of the notification:

25 April 2025

3. Date and duration of the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 27(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

Prolongation of border control at internal borders from 9 June 2025 00:00 until December 8 2025.

4. Scope of the proposed reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders, specifying at which part or parts of the internal borders border control will be reintroduced or prolonged (Article 27(1), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

The temporary reintroduction of internal border controls is limited to the Netherlands' land borders with Belgium and Germany and to its Schengen air borders. In relation to air borders, controls will be restricted to specific flights which, according to risk analysis or intelligence, are associated with a risk of irregular migration or cross-border crime.

5. Notification for a:

☐ first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (unforeseeable event): Article 25a(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

☐ prolongation of border control at internal borders (unforeseeable event): Article 25a(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

N/A

☐ first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event): Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

☒ prolongation of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event): Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Previous reintroduction of border control at internal borders from 9 December 2024, until 8 June 2025.

- ☐ prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

N/A

- ☐ prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years and 6 months, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

N/A

- ☐ reintroduction of border control at internal borders in accordance with a Council Implementing Decision: Article 28(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

NB:

A continuation of a reintroduction of border control at the internal borders does not have to be considered a prolongation if the serious threat to public policy or internal security upon which it is based is different from the serious threat that motivated the preceding reintroduction of border control at the internal border. If this is the case, please notify for a first reintroduction and specify the new and distinct nature of the serious threat to public policy or internal security under 7.

6. If the notification for a foreseeable event is made less than four weeks before the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 25a(4), (5) and (6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

N/A

7. Serious threat to public policy or internal security, consisting of:

- ☐ terrorist incidents or threats, and threats posed by serious organised crime

N/A

- ☐ large-scale public health emergencies

N/A

- ☐ an exceptional situation characterised by sudden large-scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals, within the meaning of Article 25(1), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

N/A

- ☐ Large scale or high-profile international event

N/A

Other

According to Frontex figures,¹ in 2024 there were a total of more than 239,000 irregular border crossings at the external borders of the EU. Although this is 38% less than in 2023, the absolute

¹ <https://www.frontex.europa.eu/what-we-do/monitoring-and-risk-analysis/migratory-routes/migratory-routes/>.

number remains high and still poses a significant challenge for the border control and migration authorities of Member States. The pressure on the EU caused by irregular migration and migrant smuggling remains great.

Over the past months there has been a decline in the influx of irregular migration to the Netherlands, but for years the Netherlands has been confronted with the consequences of a large influx of irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and substantial secondary migration flows, exacerbated by the malfunctioning Dublin system. This has caused high and cumulative pressure on the existing migration system, in particular on reception capacity and the available housing at local level. Institutions dealing with asylum and reception of migrants have reached their limits in terms of capacity. At the same time, the number of reported crimes suspected to have been committed by persons residing at reception centres is significant. This number increased by 14% to 6,800 in 2023,² which matched the increase in the number of migrants housed at reception centres in the Netherlands. The nationalities associated with having relatively high percentages of suspected offenders are mainly nationalities associated with a low chance of being granted asylum. The problem of public policy disruptions and criminal behaviour has a negative impact on public perceptions of those asylum seekers, as well as on the level of public support for asylum seekers in general.

The government of the Netherlands continues to take all possible measures to prevent further disruption to the migration system, as that would lead to dire circumstances and pose an increased threat to public policy.

Given the continued pressure on the national migration system, in particular on reception capacity, caused by the continued pressure on external borders and high levels of secondary migration (for which the Netherlands is still an important destination country) – which in turn increases the pressure on the asylum system, in particular reception capacity – the government of the Netherlands has decided to prolong the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the internal borders from 9 June 2025 00:00 until 8 December 2025.

At the same time, the Netherlands is taking measures to enhance cooperation with its neighbouring Member States in the field of cross-border police cooperation and transfer of irregular migrants apprehended at the internal borders. In addition, work has been started to amend national legislation in order to improve and enhance police checks in accordance with Article 23 of the Schengen Borders Code. Once further progress has been made on this work, the Netherlands will reassess whether the prolongation of internal border controls is still deemed necessary.

European migration situation

Despite a decline in the number of irregular border crossings at the EU's external borders, and measures taken by Member States and supported by Frontex, the persistent pressure of irregular migration on the EU's external borders continues to pose challenges to the Netherlands.

These challenges have serious consequences for border control agencies, and organisations dealing with migration, asylum and/or reception of irregular migrants. Secondary movements, some of which are facilitated by migrant smugglers, continue to constitute the main source of

² Report by the Dutch Research and Data Centre (WODC): <https://open.overheid.nl/documenten/dpc-29d92296f1f4b11cf7940e2da3d7aa008c68c5554/pdf>. The WODC report containing figures for 2024 is expected at the end of June 2025.

the large inflows of asylum seekers experienced by several Member States, including the Netherlands.

People smuggling continues to be a lucrative business and migrants are still prepared to pay high fees for the dangerous crossings and other means of travel provided by smugglers, at great risk to their own lives. Instrumentalisation of migration by third countries further contributes to this undesirable situation.

Between March 2024 and March 2025, some 210 instances of migrant smuggling were recorded by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (RNLM) during checks in the vicinity of the internal land borders with Belgium and Germany alone. Consequently, some 130 criminal suspects were arrested.

The overall situation continues to cause serious problems regarding irregular migration, migrant smuggling, asylum and basic services such as reception and housing, and in relation to public safety in this regard.

National migration pressure

In the first three months of the internal border controls conducted at the Netherlands' borders with Belgium and Germany, the RNLM denied entry to almost 250 individuals who did not fulfil the entry conditions under the Schengen Borders Code. In the same period, 90 individuals were arrested during internal border controls in connection with migration crime, such as document fraud and human trafficking, traffic offences and drugs related crimes.³

Although the number of first-time asylum seekers in 2024 in the Netherlands was 16% lower than in 2023 (approximately 32,000), it nonetheless fits in the trend of high influx the Netherlands has had to deal with in recent years. The Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) is unable to keep up with this sustained influx. In addition, the return of migrants who are not permitted to stay in the Netherlands is not proceeding quickly enough, partly because countries of origin are not cooperating sufficiently. The outflow of beneficiaries of international protection from reception centres to regular housing in municipalities is also low.

As a result, reception centres are still overcrowded, which at times leads to incidents. The challenges facing the asylum system as whole, and the pressure on that system, therefore remain extremely great. A significant percentage (59%) of migrants who apply for international protection in the Netherlands are still Eurodac-registered in another Member State. The ongoing impossibility of Dublin transfers to Greece, Hungary and Italy is contributing to the pressure on the asylum system in the Netherlands.

Because of the abovementioned developments, the migration system in general and the asylum system in the Netherlands in particular, continues to be highly overburdened. A peak in the number of regular and irregular migrants arriving in the Netherlands has also driven up demand for facilities such as housing, care, education and integration programmes. More and more municipalities are indicating that they do not have the capacity to accommodate any (or more) asylum seekers or beneficiaries of international protection.

Due to the developments described above, the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) is having to cope with an increasing number of residents (both asylum applicants and beneficiaries of international protection to whom it has not been possible to assign

³ House of Representatives, 2024-2025 session, 30 821, no. 267.

housing). In 2024, occupancy at COA reception centres rose from 64,400 to 72,500. These high occupancy rates, longer stay times and suboptimal conditions in emergency reception centres regularly put the safety and health of both asylum seekers and COA employees at risk. This is especially the case for vulnerable persons.

In addition to hosting asylum seekers, municipalities in the Netherlands are providing reception to around 118,300 Ukrainian displaced persons, some 93,400 of whom are housed in public reception facilities. The occupancy rate of these emergency facilities is currently around 99%.

8. Names of authorised border crossing points

In order to avoid disruption to cross-border traffic, no specific border crossing points have been designated.

9. Measures taken by other Member States (if applicable)

The Federal Government of Germany has prolonged its temporary internal border controls until 15 September 2025.

10. Assessment of necessity and proportionality under Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

10.1 Appropriateness: explanation how the reintroduction of border control at internal borders is likely to adequately remedy the threat

Before the reintroduction of the temporary measure of internal border control, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (RNLM) performed mobile security monitoring checks (MTV) on the basis of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000) and Article 23 of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) in the border regions with Belgium and Germany. These MTV checks, performed on a random basis and/or based on information and intelligence, are carried out on roads, on trains, and at airports for certain flights arriving from the Schengen area. Individuals apprehended during MTV checks were transferred to a neighbouring Member State. Depending on the individual situation and border section, the transfer could take multiple days to conduct.

The RNLM verifies the residence status and identity of individuals during these checks, which are primarily for the purpose of aliens supervision. However, national legislation imposes restrictions on MTV checks, including in terms of numbers and duration of checks.

The temporary reintroduction of internal border control gives the RNLM greater flexibility in the implementation of checks. It provides the possibility to carry out checks for a longer period of time, to conduct more checks at the same spot and makes it possible to swiftly and effectively deny entry to individuals who do not fulfil the conditions under the Schengen Borders Code.

In addition, internal border checks have a broader purpose than MTV, and assist in the detection and prevention of irregular migration and the detection of cross-border crime, including people smuggling, and therefore contribute to the security of the Schengen area and the prevention of irregular migration. Just like during MTV checks, the RNLM makes use of technology, especially automatic number plate recognition cameras. As mentioned above, in the first three months of internal border controls, the RNLM denied entry to almost 250 individuals and arrested 90 individuals. During the same period a year earlier, approximately 150 people were transferred to Belgium and Germany after being apprehended during mobile security checks.⁴ In order to conduct internal border controls, the RNLM has adapted its

⁴ House of Representatives, 2024-2025 session, 30 821, no. 267.

	operations within a very short period of time and has taken measures to limit any negative impact on border traffic and the border regions. Possibilities for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of internal border controls are continuously being examined. Overall, the results of the first three months of internal border controls are encouraging and the controls are helping to remedy the threat posed by irregular migration and cross-border crime. Furthermore, the Netherlands continues to take measures to minimise the effect on cross-border traffic, for example by refraining as much as possible from measures that could disrupt traffic flows, and by conducting risk-based checks and consulting with local authorities. As a result, the prolongation of internal border controls is considered to be an appropriate measure to address the above-mentioned existing challenges and threats.
10.2.	Explanation why the objectives pursued by the reintroduction cannot be obtained by: Please refer to the answer provided to question 10.1.
10.3.	Likely impact on the movement of persons within the area without internal border control and the functioning of cross-border regions As stated above, the RNLM has been instructed to conduct border checks in such a way as to minimise the impact on cross-border traffic, for example by refraining from measures that could disrupt traffic flows. In addition, the Dutch authorities attach great importance to remaining in close contact with the Belgian and German authorities to prevent internal border checks from having a significant impact on the movement of persons and goods. Furthermore, the Netherlands is committed to ensuring that the economic, social and infrastructural impact on border regions and their residents is minimised to the greatest possible extent. Since the reintroduction of internal border controls, the impact on traffic flows and cross-border regions has been closely monitored, including through continuous contact with local authorities, other ministries and neighbouring Member States. To date, there have been no indications that the Dutch border controls have had any significant negative impact. Monitoring of the effects of internal border controls on the region and on traffic flows will continue.
10.4.	If the serious threat consists of sudden large-scale unauthorised movements (Article 25(1), point (c), and 27(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399): N/A
10.5.	Opinion of the Commission and consultation process (if applicable) N/A

11. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 6 months in accordance with Article 25a(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Article 27(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

11.1.	Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 Please refer to the answer provided to question 10.1.
11.2.	Scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat The current threat level is comparable to that at the time of reintroduction of internal border controls by the Netherlands last year. How long the threat will persist is difficult to

	<i>predict, as pressure on external borders and secondary flows is subject to fluctuations. The number of asylum applications in the Netherlands has dropped in 2025, but this has not (yet) led to a significant improvement in the situation regarding the overburdened migration and asylum system. Nonetheless, the Netherlands is monitoring the situation closely, and is committed to limiting the duration of the internal border controls as much as possible. It is therefore working on amending national legislation with a view to improving and enhancing the effectiveness of MTV checks, including changes to the restrictions on the number (and duration) of police checks.</i>
--	---

12. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for a major exceptional situation (Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399).

12.1.	Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399
	N/A
12.2.	Action taken in response to an opinion of the Commission issued in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)
	N/A
12.3.	Action taken in response to a consultation process initiated in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)
	N/A
12.4.	Substantiation of the continued threat to public policy or internal security
	N/A
12.5.	Explanation why alternative measures are ineffective
	N/A
12.6.	Presentation of mitigating measures
	N/A
12.7.	Where appropriate: presentation of the means, actions, conditions and timeline with a view to lifting border control at internal borders
	N/A

13. Any further information (optional)

<i>The Netherlands and Belgium are in contact with regard to the enhancement of cooperation on checks at the internal borders, especially with regard to improving the transfer process for migrants who are apprehended at the internal borders.</i>
<i>At the same time, the Netherlands and Germany are exploring possibilities to improve their cross-border cooperation.</i>

14. Withholding of information on grounds of public security (Article 27(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

N/A

15. Confidentiality of information (Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

Please indicate and specify if any of the notified information is to remain confidential.

N/A

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/315/oj

ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition)