Joint non-paper

on

Establishing a Joint European Continent Military Mobility Area

In light of the rapidly deteriorating geopolitical security environment, the importance of enhanced Military Mobility (MilMob) within the European Union and beyond has become increasingly pressing. Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine and continued hybrid threats against EU Member States have clearly indicated that the EU faces growing security threats, particularly at the Eastern borders. These developments underscore the urgent need for swift and decisive action: We have to strengthen our collective capability to deploy military personnel, equipment and assets effectively and efficiently across EU territory and beyond. MilMob is essential to reinforce NATO's collective deterrence and defence.

The signing nations welcome the announced 'Military Mobility Package', which demonstrates the joint commitment by the Commission, EEAS and EDA to address the complex challenges related to MilMob. We look forward to working closely together with these EU institutions and other Member States, now and in the future. Desired effects and end-states need to be defined and prioritised in line with NATO's enablement requirements, and become drivers for policy.

In order to use the momentum, we propose the following three areas of action as priorities:

- 1. INTENSIFY cooperation and coordination in Europe
- 2. INVEST effectively in dual-use infrastructure
- 3. IMPLEMENT harmonised rules and procedures

1. Intensify cooperation and coordination in Europe

We propose for Europe to develop **one Joint European Continent Military Mobility Area (JEC MMA)** as the desired 'end state' of our joint European efforts and principle policy goal.

In order to achieve this goal, acknowledging the current sense of urgency, the EU and its Member States are requested to cooperate with European partner nations, and to collectively commit to collaboration, harmonisation and simplification to enable MilMob expansion within Europe. Strategically, the latest EU-initiatives underline this aspect: Apart from the "MilMob-Package", the "White Paper on Defence Readiness 2030" (2025) specifically addresses MilMob and depicts **it as a core capability**, calling upon the Member States to focus on its enhancement accordingly. The signing nations underline this aspect and already show commitment through various initiatives, such as the PESCO project Military Mobility and the Model Corridor of the Netherlands-Germany-Poland.

Herewith, cross-organisational coordination of the different roles and responsibilities of the EU and NATO and the continued commitment to improve MilMob and Enablement together is necessary, based on an enhanced Structured Dialogue on MilMob. To follow through with the implementation of this task in an effective and timely manner, we strongly recommend to coordinate and cooperate more intensively with NATO and prevent duplication and additional bureaucracy. A JEC MMA can only be achieved when both organisations align their powers towards this common goal.

In that regard, we propose to establish a **coordinating element within the EU that has both civilian and military expertise at the strategic and operational level** to coordinate effectively with NATO at all levels (HQ, SHAPE and JSEC) as equal MilMob

counterparts. National Subject Matter Experts should be involved at all levels, while **interoperability** between the EU, its Member States and NATO — including classification, for both classified and unclassified data — must be further advanced.

In addition to the legal framework, the strategic basis and dedicated coordinating elements, a **Working Plan on MilMob** with joint NATO-EU recommendations among the stakeholders should structure and monitor the fastest implementation of our actions.

2. Invest effectively in dual-use infrastructure

For the swift deployment of military personnel, equipment and assets across EU territory and beyond, the dual-use-infrastructure needs further improvements. The current transport infrastructure lacks sufficient capacity for large-scale, short-notice military movements; to address this, the EU must support funding in dual-use infrastructure. Additional transportation capabilities and services (incl. HNS) as well as smart multinational cooperation between the military and the private sector, notably the defence industry, should be increased, too.

Therefore, we welcome the proposal by the Commission to continue with the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) within the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), and to include transport and military mobility. This will enable us to **clearly prioritise** projects that are most urgent from a military operational and strategic perspective. To assure this, we consider it important that besides the civilian perspective the **EU Military Staff also provides advice** on MilMob activities, in particular in the context of CEF, to ensure military needs are met and NATO requirements are fully taken into account.

3. IMPLEMENT harmonised rules and procedures

We emphasise the importance of ensuring that rules and procedures governing MilMob are fit for purpose. It is essential that we have an EU-NATO comprehensive set of rules that cater to peacetime, crisis and conflict situations. Armed forces should be supported by simple procedures across all domains that enhance their ability to move personnel and equipment swiftly and efficiently. Concrete solutions for such procedures have already been developed in the Model Corridor of the Netherlands-Germany-Poland (details see report from September 2025), which can serve as best practice for EU-wide harmonisation¹. Additionally, it is necessary that **cross-border movement permissions are granted within a maximum of three working days (in times of crisis and for exercises,** as laid down in the MilMob Pledge 2024) and NATO timelines are met.

Furthermore, the synchronisation of military requirements between the EU², as adopted by the Council, and NATO³ military requirements would be beneficial in supporting Member States efforts to improve infrastructure and make it suitable for military movement. Practical guidance on how these requirements should be understood would assist Member States in assessing their infrastructure and determining where investments are needed.

In times of crisis, Member States would benefit from rules that enable rapid and decisive action. At present, each EU Member State operates its own national crisis structure, but there is no common EU framework for the grey zone between peace and conflict, even though there is a strong need for one. Therefore, we want to work toward a common

³ Criteria and Standards for the Zones of the RSN.

¹ The report was co-developed by the Netherlands, Germany and Poland as the outcome of 18 months of cooperation. Several other Member States (incl. BEL, LUX, CZE, SLK, LTU) have signaled their interest to implement its outcomes nationally and join a future follow-up initiative.

² ST 6728/25 ADD1.

understanding of the possibility to deploy a **crisis-mechanism**⁴ at national level, supported by EU guidelines. This would help Member States develop a shared perception at EU level of the types of situations that justify the application of **emergency measures** to prioritise military transport over civilian transport for all modes of transport⁵, based on a balanced assessment which encompasses both military and civilian interests.

⁴ When NATO response measures call for action, Nations are expected to provide Host Nation Support. Transit Nations need to be supported by supra-national legislation and procedures for efficient and expeditious pan-European mobility.

⁵ As has, for example, been done in Article 47 of Proposal for a Rail Capacity Regulation (COM/2023/443 final).

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